Can we reverse the decline of Earth's habitability?

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- 1. Status today
- 2. Projections
- 3. Responses
- 4. Transformation

1. Status today





Climate change impacts everywhere (77785 studies)



impact evidence, derived by machine-learning from 77,785 studies

Callaghan et al. 2021



Isbell et al. 2022

	freshwater fishes	<u>54</u>	35	3	21		*
	reptiles	52	3	3	20		e.
	5 bacteria	55		31	20		3
laxa	terrestrial invertebrates n = 470	<u>50</u> t		30	20		**
	reshwater invertebrates n = 159	50 fr	•	30	20		
	fungi n = 94	5	45	30		12	ෂ
	birds n = 287		44	30	17		*
	terrestrial plants n = 1215		40	29	+	<u>12</u>	*
	marine invertebrates		43	5	2	<u>10</u>	*
	marine fishes	_	40	5	2	10	Ф
	protists n = 83		38		24	10	₩
					T 1		

Species loss



Ecosystem loss DRIVERS



EXAMPLES OF DECLINES IN NATURE

ECOSYSTEM EXTENT AND CONDITION

Natural ecosystems have **declined by 47 per cent** on average, relative to their earliest estimated states.

SPECIES EXTINCTION RISK

Approximately **25 per cent of species are already threatened with extinction** in most animal and plant groups studied.

ECOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES

Biotic integrity—the abundance of naturallypresent species—has **declined by 23 per cent** on average in terrestrial communities.*

BIOMASS AND SPECIES ABUNDANCE

The global biomass of wild mammals has **fallen by 82 per cent**.* Indicators of vertebrate abundance have declined rapidly since 1970

NATURE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

72 per cent of indicators developed by indigenous peoples and local communities show **ongoing deterioration** of elements of nature important to them

* Since prehistory

Figure SPM 2 Examples of global declines in nature, emphasizing declines in biodiversity, that have been and are being caused by direct and indirect drivers of change.





Observed human vulnerability to climate change is a key risk factor and differs globally

Vulnerability at the national level varies. Vulnerability also greatly differs within countries. Countries with moderate or low average vulnerability have sub-populations with high vulnerability and vice versa.





(Box9.2.1, 11.4, 14.4, Cross-Chapter Box INDIG)

Pie charts

Flood Storm

Drought Heat Wild Fires

The size of the pie charts show average mortality per hazard event per region between 2010 and 2020. The slices of pie charts show the distribution of deaths from a particular hazard.



Examples of vulnerable local groups across different contexts include the following:

- Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic | health inequality, limited access to subsistence resources and culture | CCP 6.2.3, CCP 6.3.1
- | Urban ethnic minorities | structural inequality, marginalisation, exclusion from planning processes | 2 Urban emnic mino 14.5.9, 14.5.5, 6.3.6
- Smallholder coffee producers | limited market access & stability, single crop dependency, limited 3 institutional support | 5.4.2
- Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon | land degradation, deforestation, poverty, lack of support | 8.2.1. Box 8.6
- Older people, especially those poor & socially isolated | health issues, disability, limited access 5 to support 8.2.1, 13.7.1, 6.2.3, 7.1.7
- 6) Island communities | limited land, population growth and coastal ecosystem degradation | 15.3.2

Children in rural low-income communities | food insecurity, sensitivity to undemutrition and 7 disease | 5.12.3

High

Low

- People uprooted by conflict in the Near East and Sahel | prolonged temporary status, limited mobility | Box 8.1, Box 8.4
- Women & non-binary | limited access to & control over resources, e.g. water, land, credit | Box 9.1, CCB-GENDER, 4.8.3, 5.4.2, 10.3.3
- Migrants | informal status, limited access to health services & shelter, exclusion from decision-making processes | 6.3.6, Box 10.2
- Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples | poverty, food & housing insecurity, dislocation from community | 11.4.1
- People living in informal settlements | poverty, limited basic services & often located in areas with high exposure to climate hazards | 6.2.3, Box 9.1, 9.9, 10.4.6, 12.3.2, 12.3.5, 15.3.4

Vulnerability and Exposure of Ecosystems and People

B.2 Vulnerability of ecosystems and people to climate change differs substantially among and within regions (very high confidence), driven by patterns of intersecting socioeconomic development, unsustainable ocean and land use, inequity, marginalization, historical and ongoing patterns of inequity such as colonialism, and governance³¹ (high confidence). Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change (high confidence). A high proportion of species is vulnerable to climate change (high confidence). Human and ecosystem vulnerability are interdependent (high confidence). Current unsustainable development patterns are increasing exposure of ecosystems and people to climate hazards (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 3.5, 4.3, 6.2, 8.2, 8.3, 9.4, 9.7, 10.4, 12.3, 14.5, 15.3, CCP5.2, CCP6.2, CCP7.3, CCP7.4, CCB GENDER}

Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change.

2. Projections

Urban warming in MENA cities

For most large cities in the MENA Region the coldest summer month in the future will be warmer than today's hottest month

Recent and end-of-century temperature anomalies. Model calculated frequency histograms (%) of **summer (JJA) daytime maximum temperature** (TX) anomalies relative to the period 1961-1990, based on the A1B scenario. Blue is for the period 1961-1990 (hence cantered around 0°C) and red for the period 2070-2099





Antarctic deglaciation





West Antarctic ice sheet and CO₂ greenhouse effect: a threat of disaster

Fig. 2 West Antarctica, showing icc shelves, ice grounded below sea level, ice covering land above sea level, and position of the 0 °C January isotherm in the Antarctic Peninsula (based on information up to the year 1962)³⁶. 1, Prince Gustav Channel; 2, Wordie Ice Shelf; 3, George VI Sound; 4, Wilkins Sound; 5, Argentine Island.





Fig. 3 a, Antarctic ice cover today, and b, after a 5-10 °C warming.

If the recent growth rate of fossil fuel consumption continues, atmospheric CO_2 content is expected to double in about 50 yr. Present models of the climatic effects of this doubling compute a rise in temperature that could cause rapid deglaciation of West Antarctica, leading to a 5 m rise in sea level. Although

Nature Vol. 271 26 January 1978

With every increment of global warming, regional changes in mean climate and extremes become more widespread and pronounced



of droughts that occurred about once every six years during 1850–1900. The WGI Interactive Atlas (<u>https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch/</u>) can be used to explore additional changes in the climate system across the range of global warming levels presented in this figure. {*Figure 3.1, Cross-Section Box.2*}

Future climate change is projected to increase the severity of impacts across natural and human systems and will increase regional differences

Examples of impacts without additional adaptation

c) Food production impacts





⁴Projected regional impacts reflect biophysical responses to changing temperature, precipitation, solar radiation, humidity, wind, and CO₂ enhancement of growth and water retention in currently cultivated areas. Models assume that irrigated areas are not water-limited. Models do not represent pests, diseases, future agro-technological changes and some extreme climate responses.





Areas with little or no production, or not assessed

////// Areas with model disagreement

⁵Projected regional impacts reflect fisheries and marine ecosystem responses to ocean physical and biogeochemical conditions such as temperature, oxygen level and net primary production. Models do not represent changes in fishing activities and some extreme climatic conditions. Projected changes in the Arctic regions have low confidence due to uncertainties associated with modelling multiple interacting drivers and ecosystem responses.





Change underway. Several tipping elements in the climate system now show greater changes than were recognised just a decade ago¹ and new tipping elements have also been identified.

Lenton et al. 2019

3. Responses

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992)

ARTICLE 2

OBJECTIVE

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.



INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE

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WMO

Shift to bikes and e-bikes is a modest, yet cheap, mitigation option



(Le Cozannet, Masson-Delmotte and friends 2022)

Habitability

...the physical and social conditions required for decent human and non-human life on Earth...

The human climate niche



Expansion of extremely hot regions in a business-as-usual climate scenario. In the current climate, MATs >29 °C are restricted to the small dark areas in the Sahara region. In 2070, such conditions are projected to occur throughout the shaded area following the RCP8.5 scenario. Absent migration, that area would be home to 3.5 billion people in 2070 following the SSP3 scenario of demographic development. Background colors represent the current MATs. Xu et al. 2020



Folke et al 2021, adapted from Hamann 2018

Climate-resilient development

(a) Main interactions and trends

(b) Options to reduce climate risks and establish resilience



Our future?

- Reduced climate risks adaptation
- Reduced greenhouse gas emissions mitigation
- Enhanced biodiversity
- Achieved the Sustainable Development Goals

This is Climate Resilient Development.



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WMO.

The solutions framework:

- Is considered across government and all of civil society
- Involves everyone forming partnerships



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The solutions framework:

Draws on wide-ranging knowledge (scientific, Indigenous, local, practical)



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The solutions framework:

• Conserves and restores ecosystems





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System action HIGHER ustainable develor Low poverty Ecosystem health Equity and justice tion **CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT** ent action Unsustaina LOWER Inequity and injustice High global warming levels High risk Rising

[Yuichi Ishida/UNDP Timor-Leste CC BY-NY 2.0; Axel Fassio/CIFOR CC BY-NC-ND 2.0]

The solutions framework:

- Involves marginalized groups
- Prioritises equity and justice
- Reconciles different interests, values and world views





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[Mika Baumeister / Unsplash; Aulia Erlangga/CIFOR CC BY-NC-ND 2.0]

The solutions framework:

• Requires scaled-up investment and international cooperation



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Increasing urgency

Starting today, every action, every decision matters.

Worldwide action is more urgent than previously assessed.

[Axel Fassio/CIFOR CC BY-NC-ND 2.0]

Narrowing window of opportunity for higher CRD



4. Transformation

Transformation

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GROUPE D'EXPERTS INTERGOUVERNEMENTAL SUR **l'Évolution du clima**

Réchauffement planétaire de 1,5 °C

Rapport spécial du GIEC sur les conséquences d'un réchauffement planétaire de 1,5 °C par rapport aux niveaux préindustriels et les trajectoires associées d'émissions mondiales de gaz à effet de serre, dans le contexte du renforcement de la parade mondiale au changement climatique, du développement durable et de la lutte contre la pauvreté





C. Goals for conserving and sustainably using nature and achieving sustainability cannot be met by current trajectories, and goals for 2030 and beyond may only be achieved through transformative changes" across economic, social, political and technological factors.

14. A fundamental, system-wide reorganization across technological, economic and social factors, including paradigms, goals and values.



2019



C.2 Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (*high confidence*). These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments in those options (*medium confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5}





GtCO₂e



Emissions Gap Report 2023

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Broken Record

Temperatures hit new highs, yet world fails to cut emissions (again)







Sainte-Soline, France, March 2023



